Computer Science Colloquium
     Shahar Dobzinski on Tuesday 4/1/2011
Time+Place : Tuesday 04/01/2011 14:30 room 337-8 Taub  Bld.
Speaker    : Shahar Dobzinski
Affiliation: Computer Science Dept., Cornell University
Host       : Johann Makowsky
Title      : Building a Bridge between Incentives and Computation
Abstract   :
Can we design algorithms when the participating parties are self interested?
The goal of the field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to answer this and
similar questions. In this talk I will demonstrate the fundamental
challenges, notions, and techniques of the field.
Examples include:
-- The clash between incentives and computation.
-- The algorithmic framework of maximal-in-range algorithms.
-- Bounding the power computationally efficient truthful algorithms.
-- Characterizing truthfulness: beyond VCG mechanisms.
-- The power of randomization.
All issues will be illustrated via the lenses of the simple problem of
multi-unit auctions.
Short Bio
Shahar Dobzinski is a post-doctoral researcher at the computer science
department at Cornell University. He received his PhD from the Hebrew
University in 2009. His main research area is the border of computer
science, game theory, and economics, and in particular algorithmic mechanism
design. His work received several awards, including the Hebrew University's
Schlomiuk prize for outstanding PhD thesis, and an outstanding paper award
in EC'09.
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